perjantai 25. lokakuuta 2019

JUSTIN TRUDEAU CASTRO WIN FIXED? Everything points to stolen Canadian elections

  • Canada, You Must Get Rid Of PM Justin Trudeau! And Fast!
  • A Soros Puppet Hellbent on Destroying Canada
  • Trudeau Government Announces $241.5 Million Donation to the Clinton Foundation
  • Justin Trudeau’s Good Friend Jailed for Child-Porn Charges
  • Another Empty Suit Who Is As Corrupt and Lawless as Obama
  • George Soros isn’t in the voting machines, but the intelligence community is

FOREIGN VOTE-COUNT FIRM: ‘TRUST US’

  • James Woolsey (director of the CIA 1993-1995),
  • Michael McConnell (Director of the NSA 1992-1996 and Director of National Intelligence 2007-2009)
  • Dov Zakheim (Comptroller of the Pentagon and part owner of Landmark Aviation, a support company for the extraordinary rendition flights)
  • George Little (Director of Media Relations, CIA 2007-2011)
  • James Clapper (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 1992-1995 and the current Director of National Intelligence)
  • Keith Hall (Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 1997-2001)

TRUDEAU, AKA CASTRO WIN FIXED?
Everything points to stolen Canadian elections


Let’s be clear: just like Barack Obama and several other NWO globalist-controlled puppets and juvenile heads of state (e.g. Emmanuel Macron), Justin Trudeau has no business being anywhere within 1000 miles of Ottawa

Barack Obama, aka Barry Soetoro Conclusively Outed AS CIA Creation.
How he was ever moved into 24 Sussex remains a study in the extraordinary success of Canada’s ongoing social engineering and mass mind-control programs, which have been running at full tilt for decades.
Just take a look at this kid ! ! !  
How on Earth did he ever get installed as PRIME MINISTER?!

There are very good reasons why Canada’s southern neighbor has published a number of highly radioactive exposés about the corrupt Trudeau such as this one:

Canada, You Must Get Rid Of PM Justin Trudeau! And Fast!


George Soros

Then there is this inconvenient fact about who it is that really controls Trudeau like a puppet on a string and pawn on a chessboard.

Justin Trudeau: Just Another Soros Puppet


Why would Canadians ever re-elect a guy who is obviously A Soros Puppet Hellbent on Destroying Canada.
Soros pal Hillary Clinton was even able to con young Justin into pulling off this epic heist of the Canadian people:

Trudeau Government Announces $241.5 Million Donation to the Clinton Foundation


Canadian Corruption

Then there is this naked governmental corruption going on in the background throughout Trudeau’s entire term in office such as this major ongoing scandal: Trudeau Implements Highly Organized Cover-up of SNC-Lavalin Scandal.
Really, the whole of Canada has been made brutally aware about TRUDEAU: Another Empty Suit Who Is As Corrupt and Lawless as Obama.
Which brings us to the stolen election.

Stolen Election

The New World Order globalist cabal did what they always do when their golden boy doesn’t stand a chance at the polls.
They simply steal the election, but in a way that it’s done totally under the radar.
How can this be unequivocally proved?
Because of how the globalists have taken over the entire Canadian power structure, it can’t be proven (unless a whistleblower emerges).
But that doesn’t mean the electorate is not aware.
Therefore, the only meaningful response to this outright election theft is to not vote in the future by declaring a nationwide election boycott.
Let’s see how the NWO globalists react to a ballot day when no one shows up.
Then they will lack the people’s consent to do whatever they want to do… which is precisely what prime minsters like Justin Trudeau allow them to do.

KEY POINT: A stolen election can occur through various means.  The complicit mainstream media can rig it by withholding news reports that document even worse corruption by featuring distracting stories about ‘blackface” in the lead-up to the poll. 

The electoral process can be surreptitiously fixed by the political administrators of either major party. 

Or, the election machinery can be tampered with just as the counting equipment can be hacked to produce a bogus result desired by the globalist cabal.  In point of fact, there are several ways to steal an election some of which may fall outside of the traditional definition of electoral theft.   



Would Trudeau’s NWO masters ever allow such a fanatical cheerleader for the Climate Change hoax to be voted out of office?


Cultural Marxist Trudeau

One last critical point: Justin Trudeau has distinguished himself as the most influential cultural marxist leader in the world today.
Truly, his administration has pushed and promoted every form of social degeneracy and sexual depravity, political expediency and governmental corruption that they thought they could get away with. [1]
This intensifying state of affairs has turned Canada into a full-blown national disaster area.  Ottawa is also spearheading the LGBTQ global implementation plan designed to destroy Western Civilization, as well as the entire world.
It is especially Trudeau’s fervent and unrelenting promotion of the LGBTQ agenda, to the dismay of many Canadians, that has revealed him to be a hardcore cultural marxist.
His master’s know that when the social fabric of Canadian society has been irreparably torn, the country will be fall prey to every type of calamity and cataclysm.
This is why Trudeau’s globalist handlers forever use him to bring about more and more societal degradation every day that he’s in office.
Truly, there’s no one like him.  But there are specific reasons why he’s so easily manipulated and duped. See: Is Justin Trudeau a Product of Illuminati Mind Control?

KEY POINT:  It’s been pointed out numerous times by the Alt Media that the Trudeau Foundation founded by Justin’s father — Pierre Trudeau — suspiciously uses the ‘boy lover’ pedophilia symbol.   There is also plenty of circumstantial evidence that indicates that Justin  Trudeau’s personal sympathies profoundly lie with those on the wrong side of the Pedogate conspiracy that controls the highest echelons of the Canadian government. See: Why does the Trudeau Foundation use the ‘boy lover’ pedophile symbol? 

Conclusion

How in the world did Trudeau’s party win this election cycle in view of his raging politically incorrect BLACKFACE scandal?
That scandal was deliberately engineered in order to sabotage his election prospects by certain determined but hidden forces, yet Trudeau will still be prime minister.
Such a fabricated outcome could only have occurred with highly purposeful design (that “design” is none other than the globalist-directed New World Order agenda).


And so it was!  Again, the people of Canada end up with a PM who is totally unfit for office—any public office!
If ever there was a time to investigate how such an obvious election theft was perpetrated IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, this crucial ballot is the one.
Once those stolen elections have been confirmed, a formal recall of Trudeau ought to start post-haste, Canada!
The Millennium Report
October 22, 2019

Scytls Pnyx.core successfully used in local elections in Finland

 General

For the first time in Finland, three Finnish municipalities have successfully carried out their local elections using Internet voting from polling stations from October 15 through 26. Scytl’s Pnyx.core was the core security engine of the Internet voting solution which was customized by the leading Finnish IT company TietoEnator with a voting interface designed by the Finnish Ministry of Justice. Finnish voters were given the choice to vote over the Internet or use traditional paper ballots and over 60% of them chose to cast their votes over the Internet.

Investors
Over the past years, Scytl has built a strong financial reputation thanks to a substantial growth rate ranging from 65% to 70% per year and the support of leading financial investors: Balderton Capital, Nauta Capital, Spinnaker Invest, Vulcan Capital, Sapphire Ventures, Industry Ventures and Adams Street Partners. https://www.scytl.com/en/investors/   

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Who owns Scytl? 

George Soros isn’t in the voting machines, but the intelligence community is

Editor’s Note: This is the first in a series of investigative articles documenting who owns the electronic hardware and software used in the U.S. voting process. Our goal is simple: To reveal the man behind the curtain and expose the vulnerability of non-transparent, faith-based voting. ~ Bob Fitrakis, Editor. 

Various far-right conspiracy researchers have been alleging for some months that George Soros somehow secretly will control the outcome of the 2012 Presidential election. The Free Press's exhaustive research can find not a single tangible link between George Soros and any manufacturer of voting equipment. Our research did find links much more frightening.

The Free Press widely reported the various dirty tricks employed by Karl Rove and company to apparently outright steal the election for George W. Bush in Ohio, and thus the nation, in 2004. Since then, a witness in our case has died in a mysterious plane crash, and all the players in the DRE (Direct Reporting Electronic) voting machine game have shifted seats in a gigantic game of musical chairs.

The Soros Allegations revolve around the entry of Barcelona based Scytl into the US elections market. Scytl was formed as a start up out of the Autonomous University of Barcelona to leverage existing concepts in modern cryptography (public key cryptography, digital signatures and zero-knowledge proofs) to ensure a secure and verifiable voting system in paperless remote environments including the internet and over wireless carriers. Scytl's scheme is intended to provide the voter with both privacy and verification that their vote was recorded as intended. 
Scytl's start up funding comes from three European venture capital firms, Balderton Capital, Nauta Capital, and Spinnaker SCR
 (a subsidiary of Riva y Garcia, which is described as an independent financial group).
None of these are connected to George Soros. Balderton Capital is the London based spinoff of Benchmark Capital Investments which has no overtly political connections that our research could determine at this time. Nauta Capital and Spinnaker SCR are a different matter.


Nauta Capital was founded by 8 executives of the European management consulting firm Cluster Consulting. Cluster Consulting was purchased by Diamond Consulting (NYSE: DPTI) to form Diamond Cluster consulting. Diamond Cluster was subsequently purchased by Mercer Management Consulting and its Europe division spun off. The principles of the original Cluster Consulting used their profits from these mergers to fund Nauta.

Two of the principals, Jordi Vinas and Charles Ferrar Roqueta, also have board positions at Spinnaker SCR and/or Riva y Garcia, keeping this coterie's control of Scytl very close. All of Nauta's partners have a strong background in the telecommunications business. In 2010, Scytl purchased a 100% interest in SOE software, an up and coming player in the American elections market with their Clarity Software Suite which is used in 525 jurisdictions in 19 states.

SOE has a strategic partnership with ES & S, the major marketer of electronic voting systems in the US. ES & S was sued by the US DOJ in 2009 on anti-trust grounds after purchasing Diebold's elections division, Premier Election Solutions. ES & S subsequently sold Premier to rival manufacturer Dominion. Bob Urosevich, founder of ES & S, was also President of Diebold. In 2006 Urosevich was listed as managing director of Scytl Americas, although his name has subsequently been removed from their website.


The director of Nauta's American operations is Dominic Endicott, who went from Cluster Consulting to Booz Allen Hamilton (NYSE: BAH) where he oversaw wireless practice. He then rejoined his former colleagues from Cluster Consulting at Nauta. In his capacity as a Nauta partner Endicott also sits on the board of CarrierIQ.

Booz Allen Hamilton is majority owned by the Bush family friendly firm Carlyle Group. A long time government contractor, Booz Allen’s current and former management team has included some of the leading lights of the intelligence community such as:

• James Woolsey (director of the CIA 1993-1995), 
• Michael McConnell (Director of the NSA 1992-1996 and Director of National Intelligence 2007-2009) 
• Dov Zakheim (Comptroller of the Pentagon and part owner of Landmark Aviation, a support company for the extraordinary rendition flights) 
• George Little (Director of Media Relations, CIA 2007-2011) 
• James Clapper (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 1992-1995 and the current Director of National Intelligence) 
• Keith Hall (Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 1997-2001) 


Booz Allen was heavily involved as a sub-contractor in Projects
TrailBlazer and PioneerGroundbreaker, which were NSA warrantless wiretap programs that spied on US Citizens in the wake of 9/11.

These programs, along with Echelon, Carnivore, Thinthread and StellarWind were designed as an end run around FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) and the 4th amendment. The programs relied heavily on cooperation from private industry, including most telecom and wireless providers, a community where Endicott has vast experience having “worked with nearly all American mobile operators and is a well-known expert in wireless industry in USA,” according to Nauta's website. 


Booz Allen also has a finger in the electronic voting industry, being the providers of the first DRE voting scheme for use by overseas voters in 2000. In the end, the $6.2 million program allowed 84 service members to vote.
Booz Allen applied for and was granted a US patent (7,729,991 applied for 3/20/01 granted 6/1/10) for another electronic voting system and voter registration system over a network. This system bears a passing similarity to Scytl's scheme, although without the verification of voter intent by the voter. 


Endicott's board tenure at CarrierIQ is also not without controversy around privacy concerns. Researcher Trevor Eckhart discovered in November of 2011 that CarrierIQ's software, installed on smartphones made by Apple, HTC, NEC and Samsung and used by the carriers AT&T, Sprint and T-Mobile, logs the location, phones call times and destination (pen-register), texts, internet searches and keystrokes for the mobile service provider without end user knowledge or opt-in, possibly in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

The FBI denied a FOIA request for training manuals and documents relating to CarrierIQ's software on the basis of a pending law enforcement proceeding. The FBI could make this claim this if it is using CarrierIQ for domestic surveillance of American citizens.


Scytl's allegedly secure voting method would be completely undermined by CarrierIQ's software. Interestingly Scytl seems to be set to market and deploy mobile phone voting applications for iPhone and Android in the 2014 election cycle. Scytl's end user verification of voter intent is completely useless in conjunction with all DRE voting machines currently in use. With direct internet and wireless reporting, targeted man-in-the-middle attacks against certain precincts could tip election results without leaving the evidence traces of 2004 which allowed the Free Press to raise serious questions as to whether the United States of America was subjected to its second coup in as many elections. 

Revised 9/30/2012.

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Nauta Capital

Nauta Capital, founded in 2004, is a Venture Capital firm specilized in early stage technology companies. Investment targets are companies mainly in 3 verticals: Mobility/wireless, Enterprise software/security, and ecommerce/Internet, have strong growth potential and a vocation to develop international markets. Nauta has $230 million under management and invests in Western Europe and the USA. Nauta invests mainly in seed, series A and B compnies, and up to $10M over the whole life of a company. Nauta has offices in Barcelona (Spain), Boston, MA (USA), and London (UK).
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WND EXCLUSIVE

FOREIGN VOTE-COUNT FIRM: ‘TRUST US’

'Expert' giving seal of approval actually Soros-linked activist
Published: 10/03/2013 at 9:09 PM



Scytl, the foreign-headquartered company that recently purchased the leading U.S. electronic voting firm, wants the public to know it can be trusted in the election process.


To back its claim, Scytl issued a press release last week boasting that the company continues to receive “industry expert recognition” for its election technology breakthroughs.
WND has learned the firm vouching for Scytl has links to billionaire activist George Soros.WND recently reported Scyrl acquired the software division of a non-profit election organization tied to Soros’ Open Society Institute.
WND also reported Scytl announced its technology will be deployed at more U.S. jurisdictions ahead of the 2014 midterm elections.
Now the company has issued a press release announcing Scytl “continues receiving electoral and industry expert recognition for its end-to-end election modernization technology and electoral roadmap implementation approach from organizations such as IDC, Ovum and ACEEEO.”
WND has learned the firm vouching for Scytl has links to billionaire activist George Soros.
WND recently reported Scyrl acquired the software division of a non-profit election organization tied to Soros’ Open Society Institute.
WND also reported Scytl announced its technology will be deployed at more U.S. jurisdictions ahead of the 2014 midterm elections.
Now the company has issued a press release announcing Scytl “continues receiving electoral and industry expert recognition for its end-to-end election modernization technology and electoral roadmap implementation approach from organizations such as IDC, Ovum and ACEEEO.”
Scytl purchased the software division of Gov2U, described as a non-profit organization dedicated to developing and promoting the use of technology in the fields of governance and democracy.
A Scytl press release said: “Gov2U created its software division in 2004 and, since then, it has developed a wide array of innovative award-winning eDemocracy solutions that have been implemented in multiple countries across Europe, Africa and America at the local, regional and federal government levels.”
The Spain-based company says the “main purpose of these tools is to engage citizens in participatory processes through the use of online and offline platforms, bringing more transparency and legitimacy to decision-making processes.”
Gov4U is currently partnered with Soros’ Open Society to support and develop a group called the Declaration on Parliamentary Openness.
The group runs a website, OpeningParliament.org, which says it is a forum “intended to help connect the world’s civic organizations engaged in monitoring, supporting and opening up their countries’ parliaments and legislative institutions.”
Gov4U, meanwhile, has eight partners of its own listed on its website, including the Soros-funded and partnered National Democratic Institute, or NDI.
Aside from receiving financial support for Soros, NDI has co-hosted scores of events along with Soros’ Open Society. The two groups work closely together.
NDI and the Open Society, for example, worked together to push for electoral and legislative reform in Romania.
NDI boasts that with Open Society Institute funds it conducted a political leadership training series for Romanian activists to “bring tangible improvements to their communities.”
NDI describes itself as a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization working to establish and strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard elections and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.
NDI previously stated it was founded to draw on the traditions of the U.S. Democratic Party.
WND found that NDI is also listed as the only U.S.-associated organization of Socialists International, the world’s largest socialist umbrella group.
NDI was originally created by the federally funded National Endowment for Democracy, or NED, which itself founded joint NDI projects with the Open Society. Another NDI financial backer is the United States Agency for International Development, USAID.
U.S. elections, national security concerns
With the purchase of SOE Software, Scytl increased its involvement in the U.S. elections process. SOE Software boasts a strong U.S. presence, providing results in more than 900 jurisdictions.
In 2009, Scytl formally registered with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission as the first Internet voting manufacturer in the U.S. under the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program.
Also that year, Scytl entered into an agreement with another firm, Hart InterCivic, to jointly market its pollbook.
Scytl’s ePollBook already has replaced the paper precinct roster in Washington, D.C.
In the 2012 presidential election, Scytl was contracted by the states of New York, Arkansas, Alabama, West Virginia, Alaska, Puerto Rico and Mississippi to provide the overseas ballots.
During the midterm elections in November 2010, Scytl successfully carried out electoral modernization projects in 14 states. The company boasted that a “great variety” of Scytl’s technologies were involved in the projects, including an online platform for the delivery of blank ballots to overseas voters, an Internet voting platform and epollbook software to manage the electoral roll at the polling stations.
The states that used Scytl’s technologies during the midterms were New York, Texas, Washington, California, Florida, Alabama, Missouri, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Nebraska, West Virginia and Washington, D.C.
Just prior to the midterms however, the new electronic voting system in Washington, D.C., was hacked.
As a program security trial, the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics reportedly encouraged outside parties to find flaws in its new online balloting system. A group of University of Michigan students then hacked into the site and commanded it to play the school’s fight song upon casting a vote.
It’s not the first time Scytl’s systems have been called into question.
Voter Action, an advocacy group that seeks elections integrity in the U.S., sent a lengthy complaint to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission in April 2010 charging the integration of Scytl systems “raises national security concerns.”
“Foreign governments may also seek to undermine the national security interests of the United States, either directly or through other organizations,” Voter Action charged.
The document notes that Scytl was founded in 2001 as a spinoff from a research group at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, which was partially funded by the Spanish government’s Ministry of Science and Technology.
Along with Barcelona, Scytl has offices in Washington, D.C., Singapore, Bratislava and Athens.
Project Vote noted that in 2008, the Florida Department of State commissioned a review of Scytl’s remote voting software and concluded in part that:
  • The system is vulnerable to attack from insiders.
  • In a worst case scenario, the software could lead to 1) voters being unable to cast votes; 2) an election that does not accurately reflect the will of the voters; and 3) possible disclosure of confidential information, such as the votes cast by individual voters.
  • The system may be subject to attacks that could compromise the integrity of the votes cast.

Voting through Google, Apple?
As WND reported in May 2012 the company announced the successful implementation of technology that allows ballots to be cast using Google and Apple smart phones and tablet computers.
Scytl unveiled a platform that it says encrypts each individual ballot on a voter’s Google or Apple mobile device before the ballot is then transmitted to an electronic voting system.
Using this technology, “Scytl is now able to guarantee end-to-end security – from the voter to the final tally – not only for computer-based online voting but also for mobile voting,” stated a press release by the company.
“By leveraging its pioneering security technology with Google and Apple’s mobile device platforms, Scytl has become the premier election technology provider to offer an online voting system that guarantees the highest standards in terms of both voter privacy and ballot integrity both on personal computers and mobile devices,” said Gabriel Dos Santos, Scytl’s vice president of software engineering.
The U.S. currently does not utilize voting platforms using mobile devices. Scytl sees such methods as the future of electronic voting.
With additional research by Brenda J. Elliott.

torstai 24. lokakuuta 2019

THE NSA AND GCHQ CAMPAIGN AGAINST GERMAN SATELLITE COMPANIES

  • Key Identifiers for Mobile Devices
  • Who can access what on a mobile device?
  • Device Tracking by Third Parties Using Identifiers
  • Data Gathering and Surveillance by State Actors

THE NSA AND GCHQ CAMPAIGN AGAINST GERMAN SATELLITE COMPANIES



Andy Müller-Maguhn, Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, Michael Sontheimer, Christian Grothoff
September 14 2014, 12:00 p.m.


“Fuck!” That is the word that comes to the mind of Christian Steffen, the CEO of German satellite communications company Stellar PCS. He is looking at classified documents laying out the scope of something called Treasure Map, a top secret NSA program. Steffen’s firm provides internet access to remote portions of the globe via satellite, and what he is looking at tells him that the company, and some of its customers, have been penetrated by the U.S. National Security Agency and British spy agency GCHQ.

Stellar’s visibly shaken chief engineer, reviewing the same documents, shares his boss’ reaction. “The intelligence services could use this data to shut down the internet in entire African countries that are provided access via our satellite connections,” he says.

Treasure Map is a vast NSA campaign to map the global internet. The program doesn’t just seek to chart data flows in large traffic channels, such as telecommunications cables.

Rather, it seeks to identify and locate every single device that is connected to the internet somewhere in the world—every smartphone, tablet, and computer—”anywhere, all the time,” according to NSA documents.




Its internal logo depicts a skull superimposed onto a compass, the eyeholes glowing demonic red.


The breathtaking mission is described in a document from the archive of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden provided to The Intercept and Der Spiegel. Treasure Map’s goal is to create an “interactive map of the global internet” in “almost real time.” Employees of the so-called “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance—England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—can install and use the program on their own computers. It evokes a kind of Google Earth for global data traffic, a bird’s eye view of the planet’s digital arteries.



(The short film above, Chokepoint, by filmmaker Katy Scoggin and Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras, documents the reactions of Stellar engineers when confronted with evidence that their company—and they themselves—had been surveilled by GCHQ.)

The New York Times reported on the existence of Treasure Map last November. Though the NSA documents indicate that it can be used to monitor “adversaries,” and for “computer attack/exploit planning”—offering a kind of battlefield map for cyber warfare—they also clearly show that Treasure Map monitors traffic and devices inside the United States. Unnamed intelligence officials told the Times that the program didn’t have the capacity to monitor all internet-connected devices, and was focused on foreign networks, as well as the U.S. Defense Department’s own computer systems.





A slide from an NSA presentation explaining Treasure Map

The Treasure Map graphics contained in the Snowden archive don’t just provide detailed views of global networks—they also note which carriers and internal service provider networks Five Eyes agencies claim to have already penetrated. In graphics generated by the program, some of the “autonomous systems”—basically, networks of routers all controlled by one company, referred to by the shorthand “AS”—under Treasure Map’s watchful eye are marked in red. An NSA legend explains what that means: “Within these AS, there are access points for technical monitoring.” In other words, they are under observation.

In one GCHQ document, an AS belonging to Stellar PCS is marked in red, as are networks that belong to two other German firms, Deutsche Telekom AG and Netcologne, which operates a fiber-optic network and provides telephone and internet services to 400,000 customers.
stellar2
A Treasure Map image from a GCHQ document shows Stellar PCS and other companies marked red, meaning their networks have been penetrated
Deutsche Telekom, of which the German government owns more than 30 percent, is one of the dozen or so international telecommunications companies that operate global networks—so-called Tier 1 providers. In Germany alone, Deutsche Telekom claims to provide mobile phone services, internet, and land lines to 60 million customers.
It’s not clear from the documents how or where the NSA gained access to the networks. Deutsche Telekom’s autonomous system, marked in red, includes several thousand routers worldwide. It has operations in the U.S. and England, and is part of a consortium that operates the TAT14 transatlantic cable system, which stretches from England to the east coast of the U.S. “The accessing of our network by foreign intelligence agencies,” said a Telekom spokesperson, “would be completely unacceptable.”
The fact that Netcologne is a regional provider, with no international operations, would seem to indicate that the NSA or one of its partners accessed the network from within Germany. If so, that would be a violation of German law and potentially another NSA-related case for German prosecutors, who have been investigating the monitoring of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone.
Reporters for Der Spiegel, working in collaboration with The Intercept, contacted both companies several weeks ago in order to give them an opportunity to look into the alleged security breaches themselves. The security departments of both firms say they launched intensive investigations, but failed to find any suspicious equipment or data streams leaving the network. The NSA declined to comment for this story, and GCHQ offered no response beyond its boilerplate claim that all its activities are lawful.
Deutsche Telekom and Netcologne are not the first German companies to be pinpointed by Snowden documents as having been successfully hacked by intelligence agencies. In March, Der Spiegel reported on a large-scale attack by GCHQ on German satellite operators Stellar, Cetel, and IABG, all of which offer satellite internet connections to remote regions of the world. All three companies operate their own autonomous systems. And all three are marked red in Treasure Map graphics.
Der Spiegel also contacted 11 of the international providers listed in the Treasure Map document. Four answered, all saying they examined their systems and were unable to find any irregularities. “We would be extremely concerned if a foreign government were to seek unauthorized access to our global networks and infrastructure,” said a spokesperson for the Australian telecommunications company Telstra.
The case of Stellar illustrates the lengths to which GCHG and NSA have gone in making their secret map of the internet, and its users.
One document, from GCHQ’s Network Analysis Center, lays out what appears to be an attack on Stellar. The document lists “central employees” at the company, and states that they should be identified and “tasked.” To “task” somebody, in signals intelligence jargon, is to engage in electronic surveillance. In addition to Stellar CEO Christian Steffen, nine other employees are named in the document.
The attack on Stellar has notable similarities with the GCHQ surveillance operation targeting the Belgian provider Belgacom, which Der Spiegel reported last year. There too, the GCHQ Network Analysis department penetrated deeply into the Belgacom network and that of its subsidiary BICS by hacking employee computers. They then prepared routers for cyber attacks.
Der Spiegel reporters visited Stellar at its headquarters in Hürth, near Cologne, and presented the documents to Steffen and three of his “tasked” employees. They were able to recognize, among other things, a listing for their central server as well as the company’s mail server, which the GCHQ attackers appear to have hacked.
The document also lays out the intelligence gathered from the spying efforts, including an internal table that shows which Stellar customers are being served by which specific satellite transponders. “Those are business secrets and sensitive information,” said Stellar’s visibly shocked IT chief, Ali Fares, who is himself cited in the document as an employee to be “tasked.”
The Stellar officials expressed alarm when they saw the password for the central server of an important customer. The significance of the theft is immense, Fares said. “This is really disturbing.”
Steffen, after spitting out his four-letter assessment, said he considers the documents to constitute proof that his company’s systems were breached illegally. “The hacked server has always stood behind our company’s own firewall,” he said. “The only way of accessing it is if you first successfully break into our network.” The company in question is no longer a customer with Stellar.
When asked if there are any reasons that would prompt England, a European Union partner country, to take such an aggressive approach to Stellar, Steffen shrugged his shoulders, perplexed. “Our customer traffic doesn’t run across conventional fiber optic lines,” he said. “In the eyes of intelligence services, we are apparently seen as difficult to access.” Still, he said, “that doesn’t give anyone the right to break in.”
“A cyber attack of this nature is a clear criminal offense under German law,” he continued. “I want to know why we were a target and exactly how the attack against us was conducted—if for no other reason than to be able to protect myself and my customers from this happening again.” Steffen wrote a letter to the British ambassador in Berlin asking for an explanation, but says he never received an answer.
Meanwhile, Deutsche Telekom’s security division has conducted a forensic review of important routers in Germany, but has yet to detect anything. Volker Tschersich, who heads the security division, says it’s possible the red dots in Treasure Map can be explained as access to the TAT14 cable, in which Telekom occupies a frequency band in England and the U.S. At the end of last week, the company informed Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security of the findings of Der Speigel‘s reporting.
The classified documents also indicate that other data from Germany contributes to keeping the global treasure map up to date. Of the 13 servers the NSA operates around the world in order to track current data flows on the open Internet, one is located somewhere in Germany.
Like the other servers, this one, which feeds data into the secret NSA network, is “covered” in an inconspicuous “data center.”

CONTACT THE AUTHOR:


Andy Müller-Maguhnamm@​datenreisen.de

Laura Poitraslaura.poitras@​fieldofvision.org

Marcel Rosenbachmarcel_rosenbach@​spiegel.de

Michael Sontheimermichael_sontheimer@​spiegel.de

Christian Grothoffchristian@​grothoff.org

  125 Comments (closed)https://theintercept.com/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/?comments=1#comments


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The Many Identifiers in Our PocketsA primer on mobile privacy and security

Version 1.0 May 13, 2015
The phones and tablets that we carry constantly transmit a steady stream of information to third parties. Our searches, shares, and messages represent only a fraction of the sensitive, private, and identifiable data that our devices generate. The data includes many ‘identifiers,’ ranging from a serial-like IMEI number that is unique to each handset to unique operating system identifiers and even location information.

Some of these identifiers are personally identifiable and ‘baked in’ to the devices we carry around with us, while others are created as we use apps or browse the Internet. Moreover, many of these identifiers are transmitted and collected without notification to users, ending up with third parties, including app developers and advertising partners.

The constant transmission of identifier data is important to delivering seamless and tailored services and content to users. However, the uniquely revealing nature of identifiers, combined with the inconsistencies in how they are collected, transmitted, and secured, raise serious security and privacy concerns.


This document:
  • Describes key identifiers for mobile devices.
  • Highlights some identifiers that are accessible, and often collected, by various parties.
  • Highlights the risks associated with the widespread transmission and use of these identifiers.
Smartphone applications do not transmit data in isolation
Figure 1: Overview of mobile device data transmission.


Key Identifiers for Mobile Devices

Mobile devices are assigned many identifiers that are used by hardware manufacturers, telecommunications service providers, operating system manufacturers, advertisers, and application developers. The identifiers are used to register devices to mobile networks, to ensure that operating systems operate smoothly, and that applications work correctly. They can also be used to facilitate user tracking, and for targeting advertising.
In what follows we discuss some of the different kinds of identifiers that are present at several levels (see Figure 1):
  • Physical device (e.g., cell phones)
  • Communications network (e.g., AT&T)
  • Operating System (e.g., Android or iOS)
  • Application layer (e.g., Angry Birds)

Physical Device

AcronymWhat it does
MAC AddressMedia Access Control address uniquely identifies wireless transmitters like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi chips in the device
IMEI1The International Mobile Equipment Identifier is a string of numbers that is unique for every device
Table 1: Selected Physical Device Identifiers
There are a set of ‘hard baked’ identifiers associated with different components of mobile devices. The various radios that are integrated with the device, such as those associated with cellular, wireless, bluetooth, and near field communications, are all assigned unique Media Access Control (MAC) addresses.  The MAC address is assigned to a radio, although it can sometimes be rewritten using software programs. The MAC address of the device’s Wi-Fi chip is typically broadcast when Wi-Fi is enabled and the device is searching for access points. The International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) is tied to physical devices and remains the same throughout the life of the device. The IMEI denotes the standards board responsible for assigning the identifier, the time that it was manufactured, the serial number issued to the model of the device, and the version of the software installed on the phone.

Communications Network

AcronymWhat it does
MIN / MSINThe Mobile Identification Number or Mobile Subscription Identification Number uniquely identifies a mobile device to a carrier. The number is included in the IMSI as an important identifier.
SIMThe Subscriber Identification Module identifies and authenticates the phone and user to the network, has a unique serial number, and holds substantial information about the user.
IMSIThe International Mobile Subscriber Identification number uniquely identifies the user.
Device IP AddressWith mobile data, devices are typically assigned a network IP address.
MSISDNThe Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network number includes the caller’s phone number, and uniquely identifies a particular subscriber’s SIM card.
Table 2: Selected Communications Network Identifiers
The operators of communications networks, like mobile carriers (e.g., AT&T), or the operators of a Wi-Fi connection (e.g., coffee shops), can read a range of identifiers from devices.  In the case of carriers, they also assign their own identifiers.

Mobile Carriers

Mobile service operators typically assign identifiers that register subscribers to cellular networks. The Mobile Identification Number (MIN) or Mobile Subscription Identification Number (MSIN) are used to uniquely identify a subscriber. A Subscriber Identification Module (SIM), commonly referred to as a “SIM Card,” includes information about which carrier is associated with the module, its time of manufacture and other carrier-specific information, as well as a serial number uniquely linked with the SIM itself. The SIM is identified to the network with an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number2, which in turn identifies the mobile country code, network code, and mobile subscription identification number. In the case of cellular data, a network IP addresses is also assigned to the device.
Using identifiers like the IMSI, cellular operators typically collect geolocation records of mobile devices movements based on proximity to cellular towers.  They also collect billing and usage information (e.g., websites visited, numbers dialled out, numbers dialled in, messages sent and received, etc.).

Wi-Fi Operators

In comparison to cellular providers, Wi-Fi operators tend to issue or require fewer identifiers. Wi-Fi operators will most commonly assign IP address information, though they may also require authentication credentials in order to log into the Wi-Fi hotspot.  However, it is difficult to generalize about the practices of Wi-Fi operators, as they have widely varying policies about collecting and retaining data transmitted by users’ devices.
Importantly, communications network providers (both mobile and Wi-Fi) are often able to read, retain/log, or make decisions based on the identifiers and data that are transmitted on their networks. For example, a communications provider can watch for the identifiers linked to a physical device as well as the identifiers associated with operating systems and applications. After reading the identifiers, they can log the presence of the identifiers for billing or marketing purposes, as well as make decisions whether or not to provide the device with service.

Operating System

AcronymWhat it does
IFAApple’s Identifier For Advertisers lets app developers track users and replaces the UDID (Unique Device Identifier)3
Android IdentifierA unique number generated when the operating system is first run that can be used to track users.
Google Wallet & Apple PayPayment services linked to both devices and accounts.
Table 3: Selected Operating System Identifiers
Mobile operating system developers, such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Blackberry, can also include identifiers that assist users in operating their devices and provide resources to developers responsible for creating applications for the respective manufacturers’ operating systems.
Android devices, for example, have the Android Identifier that is generated the first time a newly installed Android OS is booted.4 Previously, Apple devices both used and shared a UDID (Unique Device Identifier) with applications. After privacy and security concerns were raised by researchers and the press, Apple introduced a separate number in more recent versions of iOS that is called the Identifier for Advertisers (IFA). The IFA (which can be disabled by a device owner) lets advertisers track user behavior across activities.
Sometimes operating systems providers will prompt users to generate new identifiers or credentials, such as a new Google account, Microsoft Live account, or AppleID. A growing number of companies, including Google (Google Wallet) and Apple (Apple Pay) are also integrating mobile payment services with near field communication options built into devices.  In addition, mobile carriers sometimes integrate these payment options with mobile app stores, like Google Play or the App Store. Users may also be asked to provide ‘crash’ information to the operating system manufacturer, and such information may contain details about the user’s device and their usage of it.

Application Layer

Finally, application makers develop identifiers for authentication and advertising purposes. They may require users to create or sign in using authentication credentials or, when paying for items, either pay through operating system-based payment systems or through their own independent payment gateways. Applications may also ‘leak’ identifying information about the application itself, such as declaring their name, version information, or communications protocol in the user-agent identification string.5
Applications may also request access to sensor (e.g. accelerometer) or communications data, such as GPS, Wi-Fi, or SMS information. Applications can also request user data, such as contacts and files. Still other applications request a wide range of information from user devices, not all of it clearly aligned with the advertised functionality of the app. Even if the application itself is only using the “necessary” permissions for functionality, advertising networks included in the application may be “piggy backing” on the permissions requested by the app in order to access identifying data.
Access to these pieces of data is typically referred to as ‘permissions’; only once a user or device owner has permitted the application to read this information does it gain access to the requested sensor, user, or communications data.
Surveys of mobile device applications have shown that applications request access to more information than they require to perform their stated functions (e.g., a calculator application requesting access to geolocation, SMS, and call log information). Such overbroad requests for data on mobile devices create privacy problems, including: the user may not know that personal data is shared; the app developer may share data with third parties; the data may not be transmitted securely; and, the data may not be stored securely.

Who can access what on a mobile device?

The range of identifiers discussed previously are not accessible to all of the different parties involved in facilitating and enabling mobile device-based communications. Table 4 provides a general summary of the kinds of data available to each party. However, given the complexity of the ecosystem it is difficult to generalize, and there is likely to be variation in specific cases.
IdentifierCellular ProviderWi-Fi ProviderOS VendorApplication Developer6
MAC AddressXXXX
IMEIXXX
SIMXXX
IMSIXXX
IP AddressXXXX
Phone NumberXXX
ESNXXX
GPS*7XX
Wi-FiXXX
Bluetooth IDXX
Login/Payment Credentials*8XXX
Table 4: Mobile Identifiers and who has access to them


Cellular Provider

Cellular providers typically possess a wide range of information about you; in addition to the identifiers, denoted in Table 4, they may have payment information for post-billing purposes, government identification information when that kind of information must be provided to receive a SIM card, credit information, and more. These additional kinds of information may be needed to satisfy business or regulatory requirements.

Wi-Fi Provider

The provider of the Wi-Fi network to which a device is connected can capture and read unencrypted data traffic, such as unencrypted web traffic. This type of provider can also determine information about a device connected to the network by analyzing transmitted user-agent strings, the device’s MAC address, or any identifiers that application or mobile operating system developers transmit in plain text.

OS Vendor

The developers of major operating systems, like Android, have access to a wide range of information about the device. For an Android device to regularly receive updates it must be tied to an account, such as the Gmail account required to access the Google Play Store. In addition to the exceptionally wide range of information about the device that this access provides, many of the bundled applications on phones, including maps, provide a rich stream of location information back to the operating system manufacturer.
The design principles integrated within mobile operating systems vary considerably, with consequences for how much of a user’s communications the vendor sees. For example, on Android, Google Hangout messages are accessible to Google in an unencrypted format, whereas iMessage communications on iOS are encrypted end-to-end, blocking Apple from easily reading the messages. Despite these differences, vendors still receive substantial information about users via avenues like mobile account backup and recovery, updates, map applications, and activities on app stores.
Finally, while tremendous variation exists across handset manufacturers, major manufacturers also have avenues for access to identifying information about users. For example, some major manufacturers offer ‘find my mobile,’ backup services, and updates. Some previous reports have highlighted privacy and security concerns with these services, including cases where personal user data was apparently sent without encryption.

Application Developer

Application developers can access a range of identifiers in the course of providing their services. Many mobile operating systems will reveal which identifiers an application seeks to access, such as phone dialing information, SMS messages, or the device’s GPS; these possible permissions are noted in Table 4. In addition, developers may partner with advertising networks or other third parties, and share their users’ identifiers or personal information with these other parties. As a result, in addition to the apparent collectors of identifiers (i.e. app developers) there are largely hidden collectors, such as those belonging to advertisers and analytics or crash report companies.

Device Tracking by Third Parties Using Identifiers

The many identifiers assigned to our devices form a key part of the operations of mobile and wireless networks. However, a range of vulnerabilities can be exploited by another category of actors: third parties who seek to track or monitor the communications of device owners.
For example, security flaws in the design of the global telephone system enable third parties to silently track the location of any mobile number anywhere in the world, as well as snoop on user activities. At a more local level, businesses are increasingly monitoring the movement of shoppers and foot traffic near and within their stores; some companies use the Wi-Fi MAC address, signal strength, and other mobile device characteristics to identify customers as they browse stores or walk in retail areas. Some attempts have been made by manufacturers to reduce the identifying characteristics of Wi-Fi connectivity by randomizing MAC addresses, but with mixed results.

Data Gathering and Surveillance by State Actors

Governments throughout the world make extensive use of the vulnerabilities and privacy deficits associated with mobile communications to conduct both targeted and widespread surveillance.
We know from a recent case in Libya that the Gaddafi regime leveraged tracking and monitoring on the mobile network as a potent tool for control and repression. Moreover, state-level actors have also hacked SIM card manufacturers’ systems to collect encryption keys, and can collect IMSI and IMEI numbers alongside phone call information. At local levels, some authorities use ‘IMSI-catchers’ to create fake cellular towers for targeted monitoring. As nearby cellular phones connect to these fake towers, users can be identified and their calls and messages monitored.
The applications running on mobile devices are also targeted by state actors. The Canadian Communications Security Establishment intelligence agency reportedly experimented with capturing data that leaked from mobile devices to map and track those devices (and their owners) as they moved around the country.  British intelligence officers exploited a popular web browsing application that poorly secured users’ information. Finally, British and American intelligence officers reportedly captured information, such as contact books, that were collected by the application ‘Angry Birds.’

Concluding Remarks

The mobile ecosystem is complex and multi-faceted, making it challenging for ordinary users to evaluate their security and privacy risks. Even security conscious users find it difficult to control the communications from their devices. This working document is intended to highlight only one part part of this environment: the many unique identifiers that are regularly transmitted from our devices. We welcome feedback and input, and hope to update the working document in the future.

Footnotes

1 On CDMA networks, devices may use an ESN (Electronic Serial Number) or an MEID (Mobile Equipment Identifier) for the same purposes
2 To limit transmission of the more sensitive IMSI number, the network uses a temporary number (the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) for most periodic updates.
3 Apple still has access to the UDID; the IFA was developed to reduce Apps access to the UDID while providing tracking information to advertisers.
4 A factory reset results in a new Android Identifier.
5 When a user visits a website, the user’s browser sends a string of text (the ‘user agent identification string’) to the requested web server identifying the user’s web browser, browser version number, operating system and other details about the user’s system.
6 Depending on the OS, apps would typically need to request permissions for this access.
7 In jurisdictions where enhanced emergency calling is being rolled out some providers may be able to access your device GPS output when you make an emergency call.
8 In some cases carriers provide mobile payment options, e.g. Google Play, for online services.
https://citizenlab.ca/2015/05/the-many-identifiers-in-our-pocket-a-primer-on-mobile-privacy-and-security/
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