At the CIS summit, Russia’s regional alliance quietly evolved from post-Soviet bureaucracy into a functioning pillar of the multipolar world
At Dushanbe’s Palace of the Nation, the atmosphere was formal yet assured – the kind of measured ceremony that has come to define Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summits. Flags lined the marble hall, delegations moved between quiet consultations, and cameras flashed as the leaders of the Commonwealth gathered once again.
But this time, the tone was different. The Dushanbe meeting was more than a routine round of protocol. It reflected a shift in how the grouping sees itself – not as a post-Soviet leftover, but as an emerging instrument of Eurasian diplomacy.
More than thirty years after its creation, the CIS is beginning to find a new purpose: coordinating trade, infrastructure, and security policy across a region that now stretches far beyond the boundaries of the former USSR. The Dushanbe summit made that transformation visible – and suggests that Eurasia’s political center of gravity may once again be moving east.
Distancing without departure: Moldova and Ukraine’s balancing act
Not every post-Soviet capital chose to attend Dushanbe. Moldova – under President Maia Sandu’s pro-Western government – left its seat empty, continuing to boycott CIS meetings while remaining a formal member. The contradiction is telling: Chisinau talks of leaving but stops short of an official withdrawal, aware that cutting ties would unravel the trade, labor, and transport agreements that still connect it to the region’s economy.
Ukraine follows the same pattern. Though it long ago halted participation in CIS institutions, Kiev remains bound by dozens of technical and humanitarian accords that have never been revoked. Since 2022, the Zelensky administration has tried to build alternative frameworks of cooperation across the post-Soviet space – with little success.
For most regional governments, the calculus is pragmatic. Ideological posturing brings no dividends, while cooperation within the CIS still delivers tangible benefits in trade, infrastructure, and energy. The Dushanbe summit reaffirmed that logic: even as some states symbolically turn away, the gravitational pull of shared interests continues to hold.
Moscow–Baku: A test of trust
One of the most closely watched moments of the Dushanbe summit was the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev – their first since the tragic crash of an AZAL passenger plane in Russian airspace last December. The incident, which occurred near Grozny on the day of a previous informal CIS gathering, had fueled speculation about tension between Moscow and Baku.
In Dushanbe, those doubts were laid to rest. Putin reaffirmed his condolences and stressed that the investigation into the crash remains under his personal supervision. He noted that the aircraft had not been struck by Russian air defenses but damaged by debris from an intercepted object – one of several Ukrainian drones operating in the area at the time. The Russian leader’s comments, and Aliyev’s public acknowledgment of Moscow’s transparent handling of the case, signaled that both sides had chosen to treat the episode not as a political rupture but as a shared tragedy.
For months, Kiev’s media outlets had tried to exploit the disaster to drive a wedge between Russia and Azerbaijan, whose cooperation has grown markedly in energy, logistics, and cultural affairs. Yet those attempts failed. The meeting in Dushanbe showed that the relationship had not only survived the shock but emerged stronger – grounded in pragmatism and mutual respect rather than fleeting emotion.
As Putin later put it, the two countries had experienced not a “crisis of relations,” but a “crisis of emotions.” The distinction captures the essence of Russia’s regional diplomacy: steady, methodical, and resilient under pressure.
Russia and Central Asia: Building the infrastructure of multipolarity
Beyond bilateral meetings, the summit highlighted a broader regional shift – one that places Russia at the center of a new economic and diplomatic geometry across Central Asia. The “Russia–Central Asia” format, launched in 2022, has evolved into an active platform for strategic dialogue with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
Held parallel to the CIS summit, the gathering underscored Moscow’s determination to maintain a long-term, structural presence in the region at a time when both the United States and the European Union are vying for influence through their own frameworks – C5+1 and EU–Central Asia. Yet, unlike the West’s largely declarative initiatives built around aid and climate diplomacy, Russia offers a web of tangible connectivity: shared markets, joint infrastructure, and a common labor and energy space shaped over decades.
Putin cited telling figures: trade between Russia and the Central Asian states now exceeds $45 billion and continues to grow. For comparison, Russia’s trade with Belarus – a country of just ten million people – has already surpassed $50 billion. The message was clear: Central Asia’s economic potential remains vast, and Moscow intends to build on it.
But the discussion went far beyond commerce. Economic interdependence, Putin stressed, is inseparable from regional security. The combination of trade, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation forms the backbone of what he called a “predictable partnership” – one resilient to external pressure.
He proposed linking major Eurasian transport routes – the North–South International Corridor, the Eurasian Economic Union’s logistics network, and regional infrastructure projects – into a single, seamless system. Such integration, he argued, would secure the region’s access to global markets and anchor Central Asia within the larger Eurasian economy.
Energy and water management were also high on the agenda. Russia expressed readiness to take part in building new hydroelectric plants and modernizing irrigation systems – traditionally a sensitive issue among the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basin states. By investing in shared resource management, Moscow seeks not only to stabilize the region but to turn cooperation over water and energy into a driver of long-term growth.
Taken together, these initiatives reflect a strategic truth: for Central Asia, Russia is not an external player but a structural partner – one whose presence is embedded in the region’s economic logic. The “Russia–Central Asia” dialogue is becoming less a diplomatic event and more an operating mechanism of Eurasian multipolarity.
The birth of “CIS+”: Institutional reinvention
If the “Russia–Central Asia” dialogue showcased Moscow’s regional leadership in practice, the Dushanbe summit’s key institutional breakthrough came in the form of a new framework: “CIS+.”
Approved by the Council of Heads of State, the initiative marks a turning point in the Commonwealth’s evolution – from a consultative club into a flexible mechanism of Eurasian integration. Under the new format, the CIS will be able to engage directly with external partners, from observer states to other regional organizations.
The most symbolic step was the decision to grant the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) observer status within the CIS. It’s a move of strategic depth. By linking two major integration platforms – one centered on Russia and its post-Soviet partners, the other on a wider Eurasian coalition that includes China, India, Iran, and Pakistan – Dushanbe effectively blurred the boundaries between “post-Soviet” and “Eurasian.”
This new synergy gives the CIS a relevance it hasn’t enjoyed in decades. What was once dismissed as a loose association of former republics is now positioned as a bridge between regional systems – a connector aligning the economic and political projects of Greater Eurasia.
Beyond institutional mechanics, Putin used the summit to underscore the cultural foundation of this integration: the Russian language. Describing it as a “system-forming element” of the Commonwealth, he stressed that its preservation is not just a matter of identity, but of mutual understanding – a shared medium that underpins trust and communication across the region.
In this sense, the CIS is no longer just a political framework; it is a civilizational space sustained by language, connectivity, and pragmatism – factors that together define Russia’s vision of multipolar integration.
A broader stage: CIS in global diplomacy
The Dushanbe summit also underscored how far the CIS has moved beyond its original regional boundaries. Once confined to post-Soviet affairs, it is increasingly serving as a diplomatic interface through which Russia connects Eurasian partners to the wider world.
During the closed-door session, Vladimir Putin briefed fellow leaders on his recent meeting with US President Donald Trump in Alaska – a rare moment of transparency that emphasized Moscow’s intent to keep its allies fully informed of global-level negotiations. He noted that the agreements reached in Alaska remain in force and that Russia continues to act within their framework. The gesture reflected a subtle but important message: the CIS is not just a coordination tool, but a political community involved in the discussion of global stability.
Equally striking was Putin’s disclosure that Moscow had relayed a message from Israel to Iran, assuring Tehran that West Jerusalem had no intention of launching military action. It was a small diplomatic episode, but one that spoke volumes about Russia’s current role – and about the CIS’s emerging function as a communication channel between rival powers.
In effect, Dushanbe presented the CIS as something few would have imagined a decade ago: a regional forum with international reach, capable of hosting and transmitting dialogue across conflict lines. By providing an institutional umbrella for such exchanges, the Commonwealth demonstrated that it can contribute not only to Eurasia’s internal cohesion, but to the stability of the global order taking shape beyond it.
A confident return of Eurasian politics
The Dushanbe summit made one thing clear: the Commonwealth of Independent States has entered a new phase of political maturity. What was once a loose post-Soviet structure has evolved into an institution with strategic depth – one capable of shaping regional agendas, coordinating economic development, and even mediating global tensions.
The launch of the CIS+ framework, the deepening of ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the broadening of dialogue on international security all point to the same conclusion: the CIS is no longer looking backward. It is redefining Eurasian cooperation on its own terms – pragmatic, multidimensional, and free from external prescriptions.
In an era of shifting alliances and fractured global institutions, the Commonwealth offers something the wider world increasingly lacks: continuity and predictability. Its strength lies not in grand declarations but in accumulated trust, shared infrastructure, and a habit of dialogue that has withstood wars, sanctions, and geopolitical shocks.
For Russia, this transformation confirms a long-term bet: that genuine multipolarity will be built not through confrontation, but through networks of partnership linking sovereign states across Eurasia.
And for the CIS, Dushanbe may well be remembered as the moment it stopped being an echo of the past – and began acting as one of the quiet engines of the world to come.
