- The Dutch Covered-Up Forged Telephone Tapes, Ukraine Hid Radar Records
- The film reveals the Malaysian Government’s evidence for judging the JIT’s witness testimony, photographs, video clips, and telephone tapes to have been manipulated by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU)
- The FBI attempted to seize black boxes, and witness testimony was misreported
- The BUK 9M38 missile dont have claimed 9N314M warhead, only 9N310 or 9N314
- The lying Joint Investigation Team (JIT) forgot, that the BUK launhcer needs also control and radar vechiles to operate.
- A missile of a BUK cannot be simply launched by pressing a button. The target needs acquisition, track, identify, lock and then a missile can be launched.
Rebel Donbass John Helmer 23 Jul 19
and lying by the Dutch, Ukrainian, US and Australian governments.
An attempt by agents of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to take possession of the black boxes of the downed aircraft is also revealed by a Malaysian National Security Council official for the first time.
The sources of the breakthrough are Malaysian — Prime Minister of Malaysia Mohamad Mahathir; Colonel Mohamad Sakri, the officer in charge of the MH17 investigation for the Prime Minister’s Department and Malaysia’s National Security Council following the crash on July 17, 2014; and a forensic analysis by Malaysia’s OG IT Forensic Services of Ukrainian Secret Service (SBU) telephone tapes which Dutch prosecutors have announced as genuine.
Bonanza media investigative team of independent journalists take exclusive
Although German opposition to military intervention forced its cancellation, the Australians sent a 200-man special forces unit to The Netherlands and then Kiev. The European Union and the US followed with economic sanctions against Russia on July 29.
“They never allowed us to be involved from the very beginning. This is unfair and unusual. So we can see they are not really looking at the causes of the crash and who was responsible. But already they have decided it must be Russia. So we cannot accept that kind of attitude. We are interested in the rule of law, in justice for everyone irrespective of who is involved. We have to know who actually fired the missile, and only then can we accept the report as the complete truth.”
This was a fabrication – the evidence of the black boxes, the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder, first reported six weeks later in September by the Dutch Safety Board, showed nothing of the kind; read what their evidence revealed.
The full 143-page technical report can be read here.
The findings reported by Akash Rosen and illustrated on camera are that the telephone recordings have been cut, edited and fabricated. The source of the tapes, according to the JIT press conference on June 19 by Dutch police officer Paulissen, head of the National Criminal Investigation Service of The Netherlands, was the Ukrainian SBU.
Similar findings of tape fabrication and evidence tampering are reported on camera in the van der Werff film by a German analyst, Norman Ritter.
Van der Werff and Yerlashova filmed at the crash site in eastern Ukraine.
This was not the location identified in press statements by JIT. Van der Werff explains: “we specifically asked [Kovalenko] to point exactly in the direction the missile came from. I then asked twice if maybe it was from the direction of the JIT launch site.
She did not see a launch nor a plume from there. Notice the JIT ‘launch site’ is less than two kilometres from her house and garden. The BBC omitted this crucial part of her testimony.”
According to Kovalenko in the new documentary, at the firing location she has now identified precisely, “at that moment the Ukrainian Army were there.”
On July 17, three other villagers told van der Werff they had seen a Ukrainian military jet in the vicinity and at the time of the MH17 crash.
Volkov explained that on July 17 there were three radar units at Chuguev on “full alert” because “fighter jets were taking off from there;” Chuguev is 200 kilometres northwest of the crash site. He disputed that the repairs to one unit meant none of the three was operating. Ukrainian radar records of the location and time of the MH17 attack were made and kept, Volkov said. “There [they] have it. In Ukraine they have it.”
FAKE NEWS VIDEO BY THE JIT
June 19th, 2019 - Suspects ENG Animation Press conference MH17,
“Malaysia would like to reiterate our commitment to the JIT seeking justice for the victims,” Zakaria said. “The objective of the JIT is to complete the investigations and gathering of evidence of all witnesses for the purpose of prosecuting the wrongdoers and Malaysia stands by the rule of law and the due process.” [Question: do you support the conclusions?] “Part of the conclusions [inaudible] – do not change our positions.”
____
A detailed description of the BUK SA-11 which could have shot down MH17
A lot more information about the BUK and its missiles and warheads came out with the release of the DSB final report and the Almaz Antey press conference.
BUK types
14-10-2015 added image in Warhead paragraph on 9N314 fragment sizes
22-3-2015 added photo showing BUK M1-2 with two types of missiles
22-3-2015 added several links for verification purposes
22-3-2015 table version 1.3 BUK-M2 can only use 9M317 missile.
This website mentions the BUK-M2 is only capable to use the 9M317 missile. Check internet for BUK-M2 photos. They all have missile 9M317 (small chords) . This is another website on the BUK-M2 using 9M317.
The BUK battery.
- IFF or Identification Friend or Foe. Based on transponder information the radar knows if the target is a friendly aircraft , an civil airliner or a enemy aircraft.
- non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR). This systems analyses the pattern of the radar returns. It can determine the type of aircraft by a typcial footprint of the radar return Also jet engine modulation, or the analysis of beats and harmonics in the radar return that are caused by engine fan or compressor blades is used to determine type of target. The return is kind of unique for each type of aircraft because of its size, number of engines, speed etc.
The H/I-band Fire Dome monopulse guidance and tracking engagement radar has an effective guidance range of 3-32 km and an altitude envelope 15 meters to 22 km, and can engage approaching targets moving at a maximum of 3000 km/h (1860 mph). The radar guides as many as three missiles against a single target. (source). Frequency used is 6-10 GHz. Frequency Band: H/I
NCTR module send info about reverbations, shape of signal and also crew can hear voice of target thru on-board communicate system or see signal on screen.
NCTR on TELAR have lesser capability then on CP or TAR.
The main difference between capabilities of Command Post plus Target Acquisition Radar and just a TELAR (as used in MH17) is in the identification of targets. A CP/TAR st can use info from different sources (civilian net, other radars), but TELAR in autonomus mode only own info (but TELAR can be connected to CP and use TAR info and directed from range even launch missiles)
- The Officer – commander (this man must be qualified and spent at least year in officer college or training course, all what going more than year is needed for tactical use of SAM battery (repair, organisation etc)
- 3 soldiers – these assist the command and had a few months of training course
If radar is hot then ready time is 10sec
If radar is cold then more then 180 sec is needed (it hard cap and cannot be passed)
The rectangle screen is the guidance screen R4-V
The radar screen
A target on the radar screen looks like a small dash. The first picture below shows the radar screen taken from a BUK operator manual. The other screen is a screenshot of a computer simulation for the BUK. The two almost horizontal small lines indicated by the number 1 are targets in the air. As you can see there is no indication for the type of aircraft nor if it is friendly or enemy.
The radar can be used in three modes
- SEARCH mode
- LOCK and TRACK mode
- GUIDE mode
When search it scan area has a range of search for 50 or 100km
When target has been detected radar can LOCK target and TRACK it
When a missile has been launched the radar can GUIDE missile to the target
.
The zone in which the radar searches can be adjusted. The widest zone is 120 degrees (wide zone). Radar is the achilles heel of the SA-11 system. An enemy aircraft can easily detect the radar. As soon as a SA-11 system is detected it can be attacked by enemy planes. So it is important to keep the radar off when not needed and keep the width of the scan reduced if possible.
So the width can have two modes: either 120 degrees or 10 degrees (narrow zone).
The range (how far can the radar detect) can be set to two modes: either 0-50 km or 0-100 km.
The elevation angle of the radar is either 6 degrees or 10 degrees. A BUK TELAR in autonomous mode uses 120 degrees wide zone with an elevation of 10 degrees. This enables the radar to have a width view. However detection is more easily. When in a battery with multiple launcher a 10 degrees width x 6 degrees evevation is used.However when a TELAR in autonomous mode knows where the target is coming from or a spotter is used to detect targets a 10×6 angle can be used again to minimize detection.
Besides radar the BUK also has an optical system. The TOV (tv-optical visor) is used by the crew to visually check the target. However in cloudy conditions the target cannot be seen by the eye and operator has radar only.
The zones are displayed in this image takes from an actual SA-11 manual
This video recorded (in the Sovjet time) shows the operation inside a BUK system.
at 4.19 you can see TELAR search radar scanning a wide zone (120 degree)
at 4.54 same radar
at 6.25 TELAR receive target info from TAR
at 6.30 target locked
at 6.32 search radar of TELAR switch to narrow zone scanning (10 degree)
at 6.36 1st crew member (soldier) on his tracking screen place the target signal in TELAR’s field of view so computer can now measure a range to target and calculate algorythm Meeting
at 6.53 commander unlock fire button and press it
Radar range
Spotter
A lone TELAR is very vulnerable for attacks by aircraft because of its radar. Radar is easy to spot when switched on. A common practise is to make use of the human eye. A so called spotter is positioned 30-50 km away from the launch position of the TELAR. When an aircraft is seen by the spotter, they communicate that over radio to the people in the BUK. Then they will switch on the turbo engine required for the Fire Dome radar. The powerup will take about 10 seconds. Then the radar can lock on the aircraft and a missile can be fired. By switching on the radar for short periods detection is reduced.
Versions of the BUK
There are many versions of the BUK. The system got many enhancements during its lifecycle and there are versions for sea and land operations. Also the vehicle has many versions like on wheels or tracks.
Basically the two most used types are BUK-M1 and BUK-M1-2.
The BUK-M1 can be recognized by its radar large TELAR radar. The BUK-M2 has a much smaller, almost flat radar.
The missile
A SA-11 can use different types of missiles. A missile uses rocket fuel. This provides about 15 seconds of thrust. Thereafter there is no fuel left. If the target is flying at a distance over 15 seconds the missile will go vertical first, gain speed and then descend, use gravity to reach its target.
The missile used by BUK-M1 is the 9M38M1.It is designed to engage fast maneuvering targets,The front of the missile has the radar and electronics. In the middle is the warhead and the back has the rocket engine.
The 9M38M1 missile is also used by Buk M1-2. This also is able to launch the newer 9М317 (with shorter wing chord)
A 9M38M1 has 4 control surface at the rear to maneuver. It is able to make 19G maneuvers when engaging its target.
A complete overview of missile types used by SA-11 and SA-17
9M38: the first missile developped -> 9K37 BUK and 9K12M4 KUB
9M38M1: better version of 9M38 -> 9K37M1 BUK M1, 9K37M1-2 BUK M1-2
9M317: better version of 9M38M1 -> 9K37M1-2 BUK M1-2 and 9K317 BUK M2
The 9M38 missile has a fuel burn time of 15 seconds. After 15 seconds the engine will not provide trust.
The 9M38M1 missile has a fuel burn time of 20 seconds.
1 – semi-active radar homing
2 – proximity fuse (9E241M1)
3- warhead
This photo shows a closeup of the 9M38M1 missile (source)
Target detection
The TELAR radar automatically categorizes targets by 3 types:
- aerodynamics; aircraft with moving engines with an airspeed of over 100 m / s
- ballistic missiles
- helicopters
The info is need for calculation of the trajectory of the missile. The commander can recognize the unique footprint of a target and when agreed with that this is the target he presses a button for launch. The onboard computer will do the calculations for guiding the missile.
This article in Russian language has a lot of detailed information on target recognition.
Identification friend or foe
This is a system to identify targets for being friendly or not. It must assure that a missile is not lauched at a friendly target.
IFF is device which sends to a target a calling impulse (coded) and must receive ans answer. It is a bit like how spies worked in the past in movies. To make sure they were meeting a friendly spy, one asked a secret question. If the correct answer was given the other spy was friendly.
The code system in IFF is top secret and changes sometimes in all devices.
Civilian aircraft do not carry equipment to respond to a IFF interogation. An exception are airliners from Canada and the US. So IFF is primarily for military aircraft.
On-board equipment of the TELAR in autonomous mode just give 2 signals: Enemy target (no answer on IFF) and aerodynamic target.
Very qualified personnel (which work with the BUK each day year by year) can separate a Boeing 777 (2 engine plane on 10 km altitude) from possible Antonov-26 (which flies on a much lower altitude) or Il-76 (4 engine cargo aircraft). But separatists can be under pressure by danger of destruction by an Ukraine fighterjet (or detection) by plane coming right on them.
In case an Ukraine BUK was used by separatists the operator would target military aircraft of Ukraine. However a missile would not lock on a friendly aircraft because of IFF. The missile could only lock on non friendly targets like MH17. This for sure must have been noticed by the operator. The operator can only launch on a friendly aircraft by overruling IFF notice.
In case a Russian BUK would have been used, both for an Ukraine military aircraft and MH17 would appear to the operator as enemy aircraft.
So the operator in the BUK that shot down might have been in this situation:
- he was instructed to shot down military aircraft flying fromm west to east. Ukraine forces were surrounded by separatists at July 17. The only way to supply them and get more soldiers to the area next to the Russian border was by air.
- A few days before July 17 an apparment in the are was bombed by a SU-25 and several civilians were killed
- The day before the Ukraine airspace was closed for civil aircraft up to altitude 32.000 feet
- the spotter might have reported an aircraft on high altitude. He might have seen an IL76 cargo aircraft
- On the radar screen the BUK operator did not see the target as friendly
- there was not an experienced officer which would double check the identity of the target.
- there was no possibility to check with civil air traffic control if the target was an airliner
So the operator did not use analysis of signal from target (and even did not see the altitude of target if they work in specific mode) and did not ask anyone about target source.
In normal operations with a SA-11 battery it would not be possilble to hit a civilian aircraft because several safety measures.
The launch
The launch of a BUK missile is pretty noisy. It leaves a smoke trail as can be seen in this video. A missile can be shot at an maximum angle of 80 degrees. So almost vertical (= 90 degrees)
The missile guiding
Once the missile has been lauched it is guided by the radar to the target using radar signals. The radar illuminates the target. The radar return is picked up by the missile. The missile receives control guidance from the ground using radio signals. This system is called a semi active homing radar.
Buk, Buk-M1 and earlier versions of Buk-M1-2 and Buk-M2 missile systems uses an Argon-15 type of the onboard computer. The Argon-15 is able to detect target radar signal (shape, length, reverbations, envelope and videosignal). Argon-15 does not give to the crew the ability to change target. The commander must choose target on stage Search, then Argon-15 calculate algorithm Meet Zone, then indicate Target in zone, commander open fire it all.
More information on the Argon-15 here.
When close to the target the seeker head (radar in the missile) will take over from the guidance of the TELAR and will continue its route towards the target.
The missile has a proximity fuse. This is fed by the radar. When the missile is within range the proximity fuse will detonate the explosive in the warhead. That will be around 17 meters from the target.
What if a Ukraine fighter was initial target but MH17 was hit instead?
A theory could be that Ukraine Air Force used civil aircraft as a human shield. Separatists told this in a video. A separatists lady (she married to one of the leaders of the DPR) told that Ukraine fighterjets would fly close to civilian aircraft, then decent quickly, release bombs and climb . Separatists could not hit the fighter because of the civil aircraft.
A missile targeted at a military jet cannot shift away off the orginal target to a new target after launch (this is called retarget). If a fighterjet like a SU-25 was flying so close to MH17 to merge with the radar signal , the fighter would have to fly within 100/180 metres to MH17. The radar of the TELAR is very accurate. Also a SU-25 is slower than MH17 even on clean weight nevermind altitude difference, a SU-25 is simply too slow to break the missile lock and escape from BUK missile at altitude. Even a less sophisticated SAM system as MANPADs were able to very efficiently kill SU-25 aircraft.
In 2001 a Tupolev 154 was destroyed by a S-200 SAM. During a military excersise a drone was used by Ukraine armed forces as target. Two S-200 missiles were shot at the drone. One S-200 destroyed the drone. The other S-200 probably never had a lock on the drone and searched for a target and headed to the Tupolev and shot it down.
In this case one of the pilots was able to detect the aircraft was hit. Also the aircraft exploded in mid air and was on fire. See this website.
An missile expert (Bernd Biederman) told in an interview that if an aircraft is hit by a surface to air missile it is very likely to be set on fire. This did not happen to MH17.
missile speed
The image below shows the speed of the missile on the vertical axis versus time of flight on horizontal axis. (source)
Sonic boom will be around speed of sound = 343 meters per second. This is reached by the BUK missile 2 seconds after launch.
Missile lauch without lock
A missile of a BUK cannot be simply launched by pressing a button. The target needs acquisition, track, identify, lock and then a missile can be launched. All these procedures are automated instead of other systems where acquisition/tracking/lock and guide aredone by different systems and people. Only unsanctioned launches of missile can fire missile (it very rare but happen) but the warhead will detonated after a few seconds if there is no guidance from TELAR.
Below you see a photo an explosion of a missile launched by a BUK. The photo was taken during an excersise of the Ukraine army. This video shows the explosion as well. And here is a video as well. Finally a video which shows more launches.
Proportional navigation
A 9M38M1 uses what is called proportional navigation. Basically it means it does not tail chase the target but constantly calculates the future route of the target. By doing so the missile is able to cut corners and appraoch the target using the shortest route and thus saving as much fuel as possible.
To intercept high-speed targets like aircraft and missiles, a semi active homing missile must follow a lead (collision) course. The intercept point is at
the intersection of the missile and target flight paths. The best collision or lead course happens when the missile heading keeps a constant angle
with the line of sight to the target. This course requires missile accelerations to be only as great as target accelerations. Specifically, if the target flies
a straight-line, constant-velocity course, the missile can also follow a straight-line collision course if its velocity does not change. But in practice, this ideal
situation does not exist. Missile velocity seldom stays constant. Irregular sustainer propellant burning changes thrust, and therefore affects speed
The nose cone
The tip of the missile or nose cone can have various colours on photos.
Green/White missile is because during development the army want camouflage on missile, when used by the navy there is no need.
Red cone is protective metal cone on missile during loading or travelling and even firing – protect glass-ceramic radome from damage and dirt.
The proximity fuse
The proximity fuse detects the distance to the missile its target. It detects the first metal part which is closest to the missile. For a BUK missile at around 17 meters from the target the fuse will let the explosives in the warhead explode. Because the explosives are in the core of the warhead and surrounded by fragments, the fragments will spread out.
The proximity fuse in a missile like BUK is “side looking” rather, than “front looking” (probably at an angle of about 60deg from missile axis to both sides). It is designed to detonate when it passes close to target, there is no point to detonate ahead of a typical aircraft target. The speed of shrapnels from the warhead is much higher than closure speed of the missile/target, so the warhead doesn’t work like a “shotgun shot”. It just explodes passing close to target and the shrapnels are thrown to the sides fast enough to hit it (shrapnel is several times faster than the missile).
Type of proximity fuses are 9E241, 9E241M1 and most recent 9E346.
So if the missile was going head-on horizontally or from above with slight side offset, then the warhead detonated as soon as the cockpit came into field of view (FOV) of side-looking proximity fuse antennas. And looking at the cockpit damage, it was only few meters, so most of the shrapnel was absorbed by front part of the fuselage with very high fragment density. The spread pattern of warhead shrapnels is not omnidirectional, almost all of the fragments are directed to the sides. Nearly all other plane parts were outside of the shrapnel kill-zone, only one wing and it’s engine could get some.
The image below shows the proximiy fuse angles of detonation (for type 5E50).
5E50 is a proximity fuse which is almost equal to 5E241M1 with some improvements near ground surface.
Depending from relative speed of the missile and target, the proximity fuse will give a command to detonate warhead.
The figure below shows how the detection angle depends from speeds. Basically, the faster the speed of the target, the more narrow the angle of detection, the more difficult to detect the target and thus the more unlikely missile will detonate.
On high speed angle near 30 degree, on slowest close to 60.
What is the x-axis. What is relative speed missile-target?
On the x-axis the sum of the speed of the missile plus the speed of the target is shown. The radar in the missile is able to calculate this speed based on the speed of the radar return from target.
The line numbered 2 is the scenario with MH17 (no electronic counter measures). A BUK missile is designed to attack enemy fighter aircraft which will execute electronic counter measures to distract the rader of the missile.
This article in Russian language has a lot of info on proximity fuse.
The warhead.
The warhead contains the fragments (also named shrapnel or strike elements) which damages the target with the intentio to destroy it.
The missile casing and components also form fragments.The identification of this warhead is 9N314. It has two layers of different sized fragments. The total number of fragments in the warhead is 7600.
The warhead lethal radius is 17 meters. This is an imaginary circle/sphere about the warhead within which any target will receive fatal damage.
The image below shows a closeup of this warhead. As you can see on the image of the missile, the warhead is located behind the radar and the proximity fuse. The roasted small metal parts are the fragments. In the middle of the warhead is explosives. The explosives will push the fragments out when the missile is close to the target.
The photo below shows a BUK warhead. Possibly the 9N314M
The image below show the 9N314 warhead
To compare the warhead of 5V28E V-880E (SA-5B Gammon) Surface to Air Missile 5B14S Warhead contains 21,000 pieces of 3.5g and 16,000 pieces of 2g steel ball fragments. (source)
A 9N314 has large and small sized fragments.
Large sized fragments create more damage (and better penetrate which is very much needed against armored plane/helicopters) and have lesser loss of energy with range, but larger size and weight decrease a number of elements which decrease probability for hit target surface (especially targets like missiles). Small sized fragments can be placed in much more numbers because their weight is less so more can be put in the warhead.
When the proximity fuse detonates, the explosive pushes out the fragments. The fragments will have an enormous kinetic energy. First because of the speed of the missile and then the extra boost from the explosion.
This is a cut through of the warhead. The piece indicated with 3 is the detonator. On the left side is the nose part of missile – compartment #1 with seeker, radio-fuse, autopilot. Diameter of missile is 340 mm. The warhead is situated in compartment #2 with varied diameter from 340mm to 400mm (#7 on picture is missile skin).
Compartment #3 (rocket engine and power supply) have already diameter 400m.
Type of fragments
Each warhead has fragments. Some have just one shape of fragments, some have up to three different shapes.
The image below shows the fragment sizes of a 9n314 warhead. The source is a presentation of Almaz Antey
The size and shape of the fragments in a 9N314M warhead can be seen in this image taken from appendix-x of the final report by DSB
Warheads have different ways to carry fragments. Basically there are two ways:
- ready fragments. The fragments are not tied to eachother. Individual fragments are placed in the warhead and stick together with some gell or glue. The advantage is that the energy of the explosion is not wasted by detaching the elements.
- pre-ready. The elements are attached to eachother.
The warhead of the BUK has ready elements.
The image below shows various type of warheads. Picture 3, 4 and 5 are pre-ready fragments. Picture 6 is ready fragments.
Possible design of missile warheads to destroy air targets: 1 – Blast; 2 – explosive charge in the metal shell; 3 – outer shell notching; 4 – internal notching; 5 – explosive charge with grooves; 6 – ready splinters; 7 – cumulative (with conical and spherical recess); 8 – multicell charge; 9 – rod; 10 – cutting; 11 – directed action;12 – aims to: 13 – cassette
When the proximity fuse detonates, the explosive pushes out the fragments. The fragments will have an enormous kinetic energy. First because of the speed of the missile and then the extra boost from the explosion.
This is an interesting post which calculates if a SA-11 missile could be detected
This video shows a BUK in action with some shots of the operators inside the vehicle.
This video also has a lot of coverage of BUK operation in Russia
One Missile, 298 Lives Lost: Profile of the Buk 9K37/ SA-11 “Gadfly” SAM (link)
International Electronic Countermeasures Handbook (link)
http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/a-detailed-description-of-the-buk-sa-11-which-could-have-shot-down-mh17/
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The Evidence In The MH17 Case Doesn’t Point To Russia Or Ukraine
- Nation-State Narrative Pushing
- British Intelligence Propaganda Efforts
- American mercenaries were on the ground in parts of eastern Ukraine
- Bild am Sonntag claimed that CIA and FBI agents were in Kiev to “advise” the Ukrainian government
- CIA chipmaker NVIDIA
- Integrity Initiative document labeling Bellingcat as a 'partner organization'
The MH17 case shocked the world as it happened and caused an escalation of the war in Ukraine.
EOF
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